Abstract-We study a multi-period demand response management problem in the smart grid with multiple utility companies and consumers. The user-utility interactions are modeled by a Stackelberg game where the interactions among the utility companies are captured through a Nash price selection game. It is shown that this game has a unique Stackelberg equilibrium at which the utility companies set prices to maximize their revenues (within a Nash game) while the users respond accordingly to maximize their utilities subject to their budget constraints. Closed-form expressions are provided for the corresponding strategies of the users and the utility companies. It is shown, both analytically and numerically, that the multi-period scheme, compared with the single-period one, provides more incentives for energy consumers to participate in demand response programs. Based on closed-form solutions, a power allocation game for utility companies has been formulated, and it is shown to admit a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, for which a full expression is obtained. We study the asymptotic behavior of the equilibrium strategies when the number of periods and users are large. We find an appropriate company-to-user ratio for the large population regime. For privacy, we provide a distributed algorithm for the computation of all optimal strategies.
I. INTRODUCTION
The smart grid, a large-scale network of intelligent nodes that can communicate, operate, and interact autonomously for reliable and efficient power delivery, is envisioned to be a secure and self-healing power network for the 21st century that incorporates various sources of energy ( [1] , [2] ). The accommodation of this vision requires the adoption of computation, sensing, communication, and control technologies in parallel with the electric power network [3] , [4] . A general overview of the smart grid can be found in [1] , [2] . For a high level background on systems and control challenges and opportunities in the smart grid, see [5] , [6] .
Demand side management (DSM) is an essential component of the smart grid as it captures important aspects of the interactions between utility companies (UCs) and consumers, including residential, commercial, industrial consumers and vehicles [7] . DSM is categorized into different components, with the aim of improving the energy efficiency in both the short-term [7] and the long-term [8] . These components can be technical, such as using advanced metering infrastructure to improve the reliability and efficiency of the grid [7] , or social, K. Alshehri, J. Liu, and T. Başar are with the Coordinated Science Laboratory, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ({kalsheh2, jiliu, basar1}@illinois.edu). X. Chen is with the Department of Electrical, Computer, and Energy Engineering, University of Colorado Boulder (xudong.chen@colorado.edu).
through agreements between consumers and energy providers [4] . Examples of DSM programs include energy efficiency, time-of-use pricing, and demand response [8] . Energy efficiency is about the long-term solutions to improve the overall efficiency; one example is replacing the air conditioning system of a building with a more efficient one. Through timeof-use pricing, companies can agree with the consumers that different prices are to be charged at different periods; these prices are agreed upon beforehand by both parties. A tutorial on the demand-side view of electricity markets can be found in [9] .
Demand response management (DRM) is the response of consumers' demands to price signals from the utility companies [10] - [12] . DRM allows companies to manage the consumers' demands, either directly or indirectly, through incentive-based programs [11] - [13] . One of the main goals of demand response management is to provide more incentives for consumers' participation in order to minimize the peakto-average consumption ratio. A comprehensive survey on the pricing methods and optimization algorithms for demand response programs can be found in [14] . For an overview of the methodologies and the challenges of load/price forecasting and managing demand response in the smart grid, see [15] . It is worth mentioning that using the framework of game theory, the idea of load adaptive pricing goes back for decades [16] .
In this paper, we use a game-theoretic approach for multiperiod demand response management to capture the interactions among multiple utility companies (who maximize their revenues and select how to allocate their power across the time horizon) and their consumers (who optimally respond to price signals). We demonstrate how our approach provides incentives for consumer participation in demand response, which is desired to mitigate the risks that arise by the continuously increasing demand in the grid. Furthermore, we study the large population regime and find the optimal company-to-consumer ratio, derive all optimal decisions in closed form, and also provide a distributed algorithm for the preservation of privacy of all market participants. We note that our approach fits in a market where distributed energy resources are allowed to inject energy into the grid. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has already approved a filing by California Independent System Operator Corporation to integrate distributed energy resources into the wholesale market [17] . The focus in this paper is on the interaction between consumers and the utility companies (energy sellers) in such markets.
A. Literature Review
Due to the nature of the smart grid, which features different entities with conflicting objectives, applying game-theoretic methods can improve their reliability and efficiency [7] , [18] - [27] . For a comprehensive survey of game-theoretic methods for communications, DSM, and microgrid systems in the smart grid, we refer to [7] .
There are three main components of the smart grid in which game theory provides promising tools [7] , including microgrids, communications, and demand-side management. A microgrid is located on the distribution side of the power network and can be looked upon as a collection of energy sources that serves a particular area. As an example, energy exchange game was developed in [28] where prices were computed using auction theory. For smart grid communications, the authors of [29] designed a network formation game to minimize the communication delay between the smart elements and a common access point. In this paper we put more emphasis on the applications of game theory on demand side management.
Recently, there have been several papers that have applied game-theoretic methods to DSM and demand response, and improved the reliability and efficiency of the grid [20] - [27] , [30] - [36] . An autonomous DSM through scheduling of appliances has been implemented within a noncooperative game framework in [20] . The participants in the game are energy consumers who are connected to the same utility company, and the outcome of the game is the power consumption schedule of appliances that minimizes the overall energy cost. A more recent extension adds energy storage into the picture [25] , where a Stackelberg game was developed between the utility company and the end-consumers. The leader of the game is the utility company, which aims to maximize its profits by selecting optimal prices. End-consumers are the followers in this hierarchical game. These energy storage and scheduling works [20] , [25] are important because they cover different aspects. However, each of them is somewhat restrictive. In [30] , a noncooperative game to reduce peak-toaverage ratio has been proposed. Consumers decide when to charge their batteries, so that the overall peak-to-average ratio is minimized. Accordingly, a single utility company updates the prices. A Nash equilibrium exists for this game and the computation of the equilibrium was carried out by a distributed algorithm. Although these works are limited to the single company case, they show how game theory can be useful and provides an appropriate framework when it comes to the multiperiod consideration for demand-side management.
Utilizing a multi-level framework such as Stackelberg games (where hierarchy is introduced) has been shown to be useful [23] - [26] , [31] - [35] . A multi-level game-theoretic framework has been developed for demand response management in [23] , where consumers choose their optimal demands in response to prices announced by different utility companies. This Stackelberg game was shown to have a unique Stackelberg equilibrium at which utility companies maximize their revenues and end-consumers maximize their payoff functions. In this framework, utility companies were the leaders of the game and consumers were the followers. In [31] , an extension to the large population regime was carried out. In this game, the utility companies aim to maximize their profits, while the end-consumers wish to maximize their welfare. It was shown in that paper that a unique number of utility companies exists for which profits are maximized. These works, even though effectively capturing consumer-utility interactions, are limited to the single-period scenario. In the smart grid, consumers are expected to be able to schedule their energy consumption, store or sell surplus energy, based on their self-interests. With energy scheduling and storage, consumers might have the flexibility as to when to receive a certain amount of energy, particularly for shiftable appliances [20] . For example, consumers might be flexible about doing the laundry.
It is worth mentioning that multi-level games for DRM have been studied in a limited context in the literature. For example, a four-stage Stackelberg game has been studied where three stages are at the leader-level (the utility retailer), and the fourth stage is at the consumer level [24] . Retailers choose the amount of energy to procure, and the sources to produce it, in addition to deciding on the price. Consumers respond to these prices through demand selection. This game is also a singleperiod game and it does not take into account the competition between the utility companies, but it incorporates other aspects of the decision making at the company-level. Additionally, a noncooperative Stackelberg game between plug-in electric vehicle groups such as parking lots and the smart grid was formulated in [26] and a socially optimal equilibrium has been obtained. A two-level game (a noncooperative game between multiple utility companies and an evolutionary game for the consumers at the lower level) has been proposed in [27] , but this game is also limited to the single-period case. In [32] , a Stackelberg game for three-party energy management was shown to have a unique equilibrium. The leader of the game is a shared facility controller, and the followers are energy consumers, and each consumer is equipped with distributed energy resources, with no storage capacity. The computation of the Stackelberg equilibrium used a distributed algorithm. Furthermore, a Stackelberg game between a demand response aggregator (the leader) and electricity generators (the followers) has been proposed in [34] .
B. Contributions
Motivated by the limitations of existing works as discussed above, this paper proposes an analytical multi-period-multicompany game-theoretic framework for demand response management in the smart grid. Such a generalization enables us to analytically study the effects of market competition between utility companies, along with the multi-period considerations at the consumer and the utility sides. Moreover, one of the goals of the demand response management is to minimize the peak-to-average ratio; such a goal clearly entails a multiperiod issue, which cannot be studied in a single-period model.
By introducing multi-period inter-temporal constraints, we could study a generalization of [23] , [31] to the multi-period case. Our work differs from that in [23] , [31] at both the consumer-side and the company-side. At the consumer-side, we have an additional minimum energy constraint that needs to be satisfied across all periods, while at the companyside, we provide an alternative computationally cheap closedform solution for the prices, study optimal power allocation across the time-horizon, and show that this generalization provides desirable incentives for consumers. Such a multiperiod framework makes it possible to accommodate numerous extensions, such as energy scheduling and storage, and peakto-average ratio minimization.
Accordingly, we formulate in this paper a Stackelberg game for multi-period-multi-company demand response management. We derive solutions in closed form and find precise expressions for the maximizing demands at the consumers' level, and the revenue-maximizing prices for the utility companies. We also prove the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium, and propose a distributed algorithm to compute it using only local information. Furthermore, we exploit the closed-form expressions to formulate a new power allocation game, we prove the existence and uniqueness of a purestrategy Nash equilibrium of the power allocation game, and find its analytical expression. In the large population regime, we find an optimal company-to-consumer ratio. This work captures the competition between utility companies, budget limitations at the consumer-level, energy need for the entire time-horizon, and details opportunities for future directions.
Some of the material in this paper was presented earlier in the conference paper [37] , but this paper provides a more comprehensive treatment of the work. The key differences between this paper and [37] are as follows: (1) Power Allocation: We formulate and solve a power allocation game at the utility companies' level. This game answers the following question: How can each utility company optimally allocates its power availability over the entire time horizon? (2) Asymptotic Behavior: We study the asymptotic behavior as the number of periods grows and prove that this provides more incentives for consumer participation in demand response. We also study the large population regime and find the optimal company-to-consumer ratio. (3) Privacy Perservation: In [37] , the closed-form solutions require each company to know the power availability of other companies. We resolve this issue here by providing a distributed algorithm that converges to optimal prices, and conduct simulations to show its effectiveness.
C. Game-Theoretic Preliminaries
A static N -person noncooperative game is comprised of three ingredients: players set, actions sets, and utility functions. Let the players set be denoted by N := {1, . . . , N }, where N is the number of players. Each player has an action set A i , and the decision of player i is denoted by a i ∈ A i . The vector of decisions taken by other players is a −i := (a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , a i+1 , . . . , a N ). Each player i aims to maximize his/her utility function u i (a i , a −i ). One key point is that the utility function of player i depends not only on his/her actions, but also on the decisions made by other players. An equilibrium concept that is suitable for such games is the Nash Equilibrium (NE), which is defined below.
Definition 1:
The action vector a * ∈ A 1 × · · · × A N constitutes a Nash equilibrium for the N -person static noncooperative game in pure-strategies (the action sets are deterministic) if
Note that given the decisions made by other players, player i cannot benefit by deviating from his action. Moreover, the Nash equilibrium does not necessarily always exist, and one may have to introduce some conditions on the utility function and/or action sets, or expand the strategy spaces to include probability distributions [38] . Sometimes it would be beneficial to allow for hierarchy in the decision process. In such a case, there are two types of players, leaders and followers. The leaders' decisions are more dominant, and the followers respond to the decisions taken by the leaders. This kind of hierarchal games is called Stackelberg games, and the corresponding solution concept is called the Stackelberg equilibrium. For a Stackelberg equilibrium to exist in the standard sense and not lead to ambiguity, each follower's optimal response to the actions taken by the leaders (within the equilibrium solution concept among followers, particularly Nash equilibrium) has to be unique 1 . The leaders have the privilege of choosing how to take their actions at the beginning of the game. However, they have to take into account how the followers would respond to these actions and how each leader's decision is influenced by the decisions of the other leaders. To be more precise, suppose that we have K leaders and N followers. Denote the followers set by N := {1, . . . , N }, and the leaders set by K := {1, . . . , K}, with action sets (F i ) i∈N and (L j ) j∈K , respectively. Denote the action of leader j by a j ∈ L j , and the action of follower i by b i ∈ F i . The vector of actions taken by all leaders is a := (a 1 , . . . , a K ). The utility of leader j is denoted by u j (a j , a −j , b(a)), where a −j denotes the decisions of the other leaders, and
Equilibrium strategy for all the K leaders in pure-strategies (the action sets are deterministic) if, for each j ∈ K,
where b * (a) ∈ F is the optimal response by all followers to the leaders' decisions (under the adopted equilibrium solution concept at the followers level). For a Stackelberg game, the pair (a * , b * (a * )) constitutes the equilibrium strategy.
D. Organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The problem is formulated in Section II, and optimal prices and demands are analyzed via a Stackelberg game in Section III. In Section IV, a power allocation game at the companies side is formulated and solved based on the closed-form solutions of the Stackelberg game. The asymptotic behavior is studied when the number of periods or the number of consumers is large in Section V. Numerical results are provided in Section VI, and we conclude the paper in Section VII with a recap of main points and identification of future directions. We also relegate all proofs to the appendix.
II. FORMULATION OF A MATHEMATICAL MODEL
Let K = {1, 2, . . . , K} be the set of utility companies, N = {1, 2, . . . , N } be the set of consumers, and T = {1, 2, . . . , T } be the finite set of time slots. The unit of time can be an hour, a day, a week, or a month. Mathematically speaking, it does not matter which unit the set T represents. Our model captures the trading between price selectors (with capacity constraints) and their adaptive loads (price responders) who have budget and minimum load constraints across the entire horizon. Throughout the paper, we place our emphasis on demand response management.
We formulate a static Stackelberg game between utility companies (the leaders) and their consumers (the followers) to find revenue maximizing prices and optimal demands. In the game here, due to market competition, leaders aim to choose their prices in the most profitable way while taking into account what other leaders are doing and how consumers would respond to the price signals. We capture the competition at the leaders' level through a price-selection Nash game. The equilibrium point of the price-selection game is what utility companies announce to their consumers.
Note that in the parlance of dynamic game theory [38] , we are dealing here with open-loop information structures, with the corresponding equilibrium at the utilities level being openloop Nash equilibrium. Therefore, this is a one-shot game at which all the prices for all the periods are announced at the beginning of the game, and the followers respond to these prices by solving their local optimization problems.
For this Stackelberg game, we fix the power availability for each company at each period. Then, based on the precise solution expressions, we formulate and solve in closed-form a power allocation Nash game for utility companies so that they can optimally allocate their power availability in the demand response program.
A. Consumer-Side
Because of energy scheduling and storage, consumers may have some flexibility on when to receive a certain amount of energy. We are concerned about the total amount of shiftable energy. For non-shiftable energy, one can add some periodspecific constraints. Each energy consumer n ∈ N receives all price signals from each company k ∈ K at each time slot t ∈ T and aims to select his corresponding utilitymaximizing demand d n,k (t) ≥ 0 for each time slot from each company, subject to budget and energy need constraints. Denote company k's price at time t by p k (t). Let B n ≥ 0 and E min n ≥ 0 denote, respectively, consumer n's budget and minimum energy need for the entire time-horizon.
The utility of consumer n is defined as
where γ n and ζ n ≥ 1 are consumer specific parameters. The logarithmic function is known and validated to provide a good demand response [23] , [39] - [42] . We note that since the logarithmic function is widely used to model consumer behavior in economics, our closed-form solutions can be generalized to other producer-consumer interactions under capacity and budget limitations in a competitive market with multiple producers and multiple consumers. Consumer n aims to achieve the highest payoff while meeting the threshold of minimum amount of energy and not exceeding a certain budget. To be more precise, given B n ≥ 0, E min n ≥ 0, and p k (t) > 0, the consumer-side optimization problem is formulated as follows:
Note that there is no game played among the consumers. Each consumer responds to the price signals using only her local information. These price signals depend on all the demands selected by the consumers and hence consumers indirectly affect each other's decisions, that is, they are coupled through the prices picked by the companies.
B. Company-Side
Letting p −k denote the prices set by other companies, the total revenue for UC k is given by
Given the power availability of UC k at period t, denoted by G k (t), and for a fixed p −k , company k's problem is as follows:
The goal of each UC is to maximize its revenue and hence maximize its profit. Additionally, because of the market competition, the prices announced by other companies also affect the determination of the price at company k. Thus, company k's price selection is actually a response to what other UCs in the market have announced; this response is also constrained by the availability of power. Thus, what we have is a Nash game among the utility companies. While at this point we have G k (t)'s fixed for this game, we will later formulate a power allocation game to choose them.
III. DEMAND SELECTION AND REVENUE MAXIMIZATION (STACKELBERG GAME)
In this section, we solve the above optimization problems in closed form, prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium at the UC-level and the Stackelberg equilibrium for the entire two-level game, and relate the equilibrium strategies to the closed-form solutions.
A. Consumer-Side Analysis
Note that the consumer-side utility function is strictly concave and the constraints are linear. We start by relaxing the minimum energy constraint (5) and then find the necessary budget that makes the maximizing demands feasible. For each consumer n ∈ N , the associated Lagrange function is given as follows:
where λ n,i 's are the Lagrange multipliers. For optimality, by Krush-Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions [43] ,
The above conditions are also sufficient because the maximization is of a strictly concave function with linear constraints [43] . In the sequel, we derive the solution in closed form by identifying two cases.
In this case, since λ n,1 > 0 (constraint (4) is active) and λ n,2 (k, t) = 0 for all t ∈ T and k ∈ K, there holds
From (14) and (11), it is straightforward to verify that
which is a generalization of the single-period case considered in [23] .
2) Case 2: at least one d n,k (t) is zero: We show that the expression (15) also holds for d n,k (t) ≥ 0, k ∈ K, t ∈ T . Without loss of generality, suppose that d n,1 (1) = 0 and d n,e (f ) > 0 for e ∈ K and f ∈ T , except when (e, f ) = (1, 1) . Following a similar analysis as in the previous case,
Note that since d n,1 (1) = 0, there holds
Thus, it is straightforward to verify that
which matches the expression (15) . By the budget constraint (i.e., k∈K t∈T p k (t)d n,k (t) ≤ B n ), we can see that when d n,k (t) = 0 for all k ∈ K and t ∈ T , consumer n has a zero budget (i.e., B n = 0). The following theorem states the necessary and sufficient condition for B n so that the above d n,k (t)'s are guaranteed to be feasible. Theorem 1: For each consumer n ∈ N , the demand d n,k (t) given by (15) satisfies the constraints (4)- (6) if, and only if,
B. Company-Side Analysis
Given the prices set by the other companies and subject to the power availability constraint (8), each UC (leader) aims to determine its most profitable prices. At the leaders level, there is a noncooperative game in which each UC chooses its optimal prices in response to the prices set by the other UCs. We apply the solutions derived in the consumers-side analysis (which was a function of the prices) and show that optimality is achieved at the equality of constraint (8) . We start by solving for prices that satisfy the equality at (8) and then prove that they are revenue-maximizing, strictly positive, and unique. Consider the equality in (8) , and by the optimal demands (15), there holds
Let Z = n∈N ζ n and B = n∈N B n . Then, for each company k ∈ K,
Note that the double summation includes p k (t) and all the other prices. Thus,
The equations in (16) can be combined into a linear equation
where A is a KT × KT matrix whose diagonal entries are KT (G k (t) + Z) − Z, k ∈ K, t ∈ T , and off-diagonal entries all equal −Z, P is a vector in R KT stacking p k (t), k ∈ K, t ∈ T , and Y a vector in R KT whose entries all equal B. The following results show that matrix A is invertible and the revenue-maximizing prices are positive and unique.
Lemma 1: The matrix A is invertible. Lemma 2: The prices announced by company k ∈ K at time t ∈ T are uniquely given by (17) and are strictly positive.
In practice, due to production costs and market regulations, p k (t) cannot be outside the range of some lower and upper bounds [p min k (t), p max k (t)] for all t ∈ T and k ∈ K, as in [23] . If p k (t) < p min k (t), then p k (t) is set to p min k (t), and similarly for the upper-bound, if p k (t) > p max k (t), then we set p k (t) = p max k (t). The expression (17) still holds for the other prices because of the concavity of the objective function (shown in the proof of Theorem 2).
Remark 1: Letting ζ n = 1 for all consumers, the value of Z coincides with N . In this case, by (17), we observe that for any given G k (t)'s,
which is a constant for all t ∈ T and k ∈ K. Thus, the power availability is inversely proportional to the prices.
Remark 2: Lemma 2 provides a computationally cheap expression for the prices. Since p k (t) can be directly computed using (17) , there is no need to numerically compute A −1 or |A|. This enables us to deal with a large number of periods or UCs, without worrying about computational complexity.
C. Existence and Uniqueness of the Stackelberg Equilibrium
Denote the strategy space of UC (a leader in the game)
is the unique maximizer for U consumer,n (d n , p) and is given by (15) . 
One observation is when a company gains in terms of revenue the same amount must be lost by other companies because the sum of revenues is constant, which demonstrates a conflict of objectives between utility companies. However, by the definition of the equilibrium strategy, this is the best each company can do, for fixed power availabilities G k (t)'s. But, given a total amount of power available, G total k , a company has across the time horizon, it is possible that it gains in terms of revenue by an efficient power allocation. This motivates us to formulate a power allocation game and analytically answer the following question: How can company k allocate its power so that it maximizes its revenue?
IV. POWER ALLOCATION (NASH GAME)
In this section, we exploit the closed-form solutions for consumer demands and companies' prices to formulate and solve a power allocation game for utility companies. Throughout this section, and for the purpose of simplifying the analysis without losing the main insights, we assume that for each consumer n, we have γ n = ζ n = 1 =⇒ Z = N.
Given the power availability from other companies by G −k , and since the equality in (8) is satisfied at equilibrium, the revenue function of company k can be represented as
The optimal prices (17) are functions of G k (t)'s, leading to
Denote the action set of company k at time t by P k,t . Since G k (t)'s are non-negative, we have
Thus, given G −k , the optimization problem for company k is as follows:
A. Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium
Note that (20) is equivalent to
where
Note that α −k depends on the strategies of other companies and it is fixed for company k. The following theorem states the existence and uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium (NE), and provides an expression for it.
Theorem 3: There exists a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for the power allocation game, and is given by (15), then update utility companies with demand signals 4: For each un-updated price p
, update users and go to 3 6: Else, send a no-change signal to users and go to 4 7: If p
The NE for the power allocation game given by (23) can easily be computed by each company k using its local information. Moreover, for energy users, it can be seen from (15) that in the computation of user n's optimal demand selection, no information from other users is needed, and user n's local information would suffice for optimal response. However, the closed-form solution for optimal prices p * k (t)'s given by (17) requires each company to know consumers' budgets and the power availability of all the other companies. Utility companies might not want to share such information with each other. To avoid such a conflict, we propose a distributed algorithm that allows companies to compute their optimal prices using only local information and show that this algorithm converges to the optimal prices given by (17) . This algorithm, combined with utility-maximizing demands given by (15) and the NE given by (23) , leads to the computation of all the optimal strategies with only local information at both the company level and the user level.
For each iteration i ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, denote the demand from user n at time t from company k by d k (t) is chosen arbitrarily for each company k ∈ K and time t ∈ T . Based on the initial price selection, d
(1) n,k is computed using (15) . Based on these demands, each company k updates its price at time t as follows:
where k,t is an appropriately selected positive adjustment parameter for company k at time t. When company k updates its price at time t, it transmits the price to each user n ∈ N and they modify their demands accordingly. Then, the prices are sequentially updated for the other periods and for other companies as well in a similar fashion. Once all the prices converge to their optimal values, users optimally respond by (15) . To find an appropriate k,t that leads to the convergence of the above algorithm, recall that the prices must be positive. So, the algorithm diverges whenever one of the p (i) k (t)'s is negative, which might happen when
for any company k ∈ K at any time t ∈ T in iteration i. To avoid this, it suffices to require
. This translates into requiring
for every company k at time t in iteration i. By (15) , it suffices to have
We have the following theorem for the convergence of the algorithm. Note that both k and t are fixed.
Theorem 4: For each company k ∈ K at time t ∈ T in iteration i ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, if the prices are sequentially updated such that
where δ ≥ 1, then the distributed algorithm converges to optimal prices.
V. ASYMPTOTIC REGIMES
In this section, we study the asymptotic behavior of the equilibrium strategies for the demands, prices, and power allocation, given by (17), (15) , and (23), respectively. Particularly, we study how the payoffs, revenues, prices, and demands are affected as T, N → ∞. Moreover, we analytically find an appropriate company-to-user ratio for the large population regime.
A. When the Number of Periods is Large
Suppose all companies have the same total power availability G total k . In this case, we have
By (27) ,
which is a constant. Furthermore,
By (30) , the payoff of user n becomes
in which G total k B n / n∈N B n is positive. Thus, as T increases, the multiplicative term KT of the logarithmic function increases at a faster rate than the decrease of
Hence, as T increases, the equilibrium utility of each user n ∈ N monotonically increases. Taking the limit, it can be verified that
Furthermore, note that the demand d * n,k (t) from user n ∈ N from company k ∈ K at time t ∈ T converges to zero as T → ∞. We claim that the revenues are constants. To see this, recall that
n∈N B n K which is a constant since both the number of companies and the budgets of the users are fixed.
Remark 3: At the equilibrium, the monotonicity of the payoffs of the users shows that increasing the number of periods and partitioning the total power among them lead to more incentives for consumers' participation. However, it might not be very beneficial to increase the number of periods to a very high value. First, the rate of increase in terms of users' utilities gets smaller and smaller. Second, having a high number of periods leads to smaller demands for each period and that might violate the minimum energy need at the users' level. So, it is beneficial to increase the number of periods up to a certain point (compared to having T = 1), but it might not be beneficial to let T become arbitrarily large. It would be interesting to study what would be the appropriate number of periods that keeps users motivated to participate in demand response while being practical.
Remark 4: Note that the limit point of the utility function of user n is the proportion of his budget to the total budgets times the total power availability. So if a particular user has 1% of the sum of all the budgets, he gets 1% of the available power. Furthermore, the revenue for each company is the proportion of the sum of the budgets to the number of companies. In addition, the demand by user n from company k at time t is the proportion of his budget to the total budgets times the total power availability at t from k.
B. When the Number of Users is Large
In this subsection, we study the large population regime. Particularly, we analyze what happens when there is a large number of followers with T fixed. When the number of users increases, each additional user has some budget B n , and since the total power availability is fixed, competition between users arises on the same amount of power and hence utility companies will increase their revenue-maximizing prices.
We start by assuming that the budget for each user n ∈ N is the same, and then increase the number of users N and see what happens as N → ∞. We also keep the assumption that G total k (t) is the same for all companies. In this case, the optimal prices and demands become
When the population is large and the power availability is fixed, it is not surprising that d * n,k (t) → 0 because the portion each user can get from the available power gets smaller and smaller as N increases. Furthermore, it can be easily verified that lim N →∞ U gen,k (N ) = ∞ and lim N →∞ U user,n (N ) = 0 as N → ∞. Thus, a balance between the supply and demand needs to be achieved, and we do this by finding an appropriate company-to-user ratio K N . Now, the question we ask is for a given maximum allowable price p max k (t), call it p max , what is the appropriate companyto-user ratio K N that allows us to achieve a supply-demand balance with the condition
being satisfied? The following theorem answers this question. Theorem 5: Suppose that the total power availabilities G total k for all companies are the same. Then, at the NE of the power allocation game, and at the Stackelberg equilibrium of the price and demand selection game, the following statements are true.
then the optimal prices p * k (t)'s given by (33) are feasible and the supply-demand balance (8) 
then the optimal company-to-user ratio that maximizes the revenues without exceeding p max is VI. SIMULATIONS We conducted numerical computations capturing different scenarios. In the first case, we set T = 1 and compute the results with the same parameter values as in the single-period case in [23] . Here, for n ∈ N , we have ζ n = 1 and γ n = 1. Figure 1 shows that the results match those in the single-period case given in [23] . This is expected since the multi-period Stackelberg game is a generalization of the single-period one.
A. Influence of the Number of Periods
Now, we let T = 4, an interpretation for which can be the following: morning, afternoon, evening, and late night. The budgets of consumers are kept the same, and as before, B 1 still varies from 2 to 42. The total power availability for each company is also kept at the same level, but distributed across the 4 periods as follows: 25%, 40%, 25%, and 10%. Figure 2 shows that with the same total power availability for each company, and without increasing any of the consumers' budgets, the utilities for users increase significantly (almost doubles for user 1). The total demands for the users do not change, since they match the power availability. The trend for the revenues is similar to the single-period case. One key observation is that the multi-period scheme provides more incentives for consumers' participation (shown analytically in Section V), which is quite important and a key issue [4] . Figure 3 shows the influence of increasing T on the user utilities (they monotonically increase and the limit exists) and for companies (some of them lose while others gain). By the definition of NE and by Theorem 3, no company can do better than its NE strategy and if any of them changes its actions while the others play at NE, the company that changes its actions will be worse-off. Now, assume that we only have k = 1 and its power availability is unchanged. Figure 4 also shows that increasing the number of the periods provides more incentives for users' participation. The revenue is constant since the budgets are fixed and they are exploited at the revenue-maximizing prices and utility-maximizing demands. Figure 5 shows that the algorithm converges to the optimal values as in [23] .
In Figure 6 , we increase the number of periods to T = 4 with a single utility company, and study the convergence of the prices. The power availability is as follows: G 1 (1) = 6, G 1 (2) = 12, G 1 (3) = 11.25 and G 1 (4) = 4.5. When k,t is smaller, the algorithm converges in a faster rate. But, there is a trade-off between the convergence and the speed of convergence. To elaborate on this, we let k,t = 2 ∀t, ∀k (this value violates the condition Theorem 4) and note that the algorithm diverges. Note that for these figures, we are using the update rule (24) .
VII. CONCLUSION AND RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
In this paper, the multi-period demand response problem through game-theoretic methods has been studied. In particular, we have developed a Stackelberg game to capture the interactions between utility companies and energy consumers. These consumers can be commercial, residential, or industrial. In this game, utility companies are the leaders and users are the followers. The leaders play a noncooperative Nash game, which was shown to have a unique equilibrium at which companies maximize their revenues in response to price decisions made by the other companies. Then, the users optimally respond to the price selection made by utility companies by choosing their utility maximizing demands. Each user has a limited budget and a minimum amount of energy to meet for the entire time horizon. A budget condition has been derived for consumers' participation and the maximizing demands have been shown to be unique. The overall hierarchal interaction admits a unique Stackelberg equilibrium at which the revenues are maximized and the demands are utility maximizing.
Based on the closed-form expressions for the Stackelberg equilibrium, a power allocation game for utility companies has been formulated. The game was shown to have a unique Nash equilibrium, which was solved in closed form. Moreover, the asymptotic behaviors of user-utilities, demands, prices, and revenues have been analyzed as the number of periods increases. In the large population regime, an appropriate company-to-user ratio has been derived to maximize the revenue of each individual utility company. Moreover, a distributed algorithm has been proposed to compute all equilibrium strategies using only local information. The paper has shown, both analytically and numerically, that the multiperiod scheme provides more incentives for the participation of energy consumers in demand response management, which is of critical importance for the grid [4] .
There are plenty of opportunities for future work. In this paper, we assumed that the minimum energy need at the users-level has to be satisfied for the entire time horizon, and thus incorporating period-specific constraints is a possible direction for future work. Furthermore, it would be interesting to add energy scheduling and storage at the users-level and/or companies-level and study their influence on demand selections and the revenue-maximizing prices. The game developed in this paper is static with open-loop information structures. Therefore, using tools from dynamic game theory to deal with closed-loop information structures is another possible direction for future work.
VIII. APPENDIX A. Proof of Theorem 1
Suppose first that B n ≥ f n,1 . Then, B n ≥ ζ n (KT p k (t) − k∈K t∈T p k (t)) ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T With little re-arrangements, we have B n + ζ n k∈K t∈T p k (t) KT p k (t) − ζ n ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T Thus, the inequality B n ≥ f n,1 implies that d n,k (t) ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K, ∀t ∈ T Next suppose that B n ≥ f n,2 . Then, With this, the inequality B n ≥ f n,2 implies that the minimum energy need is satisfied Combining both conditions, we conclude that the condition B n ≥ max{f n,1 , f n,2 } guarantees that the maximizing demand in (15) is feasible. The other implication is omitted due to its simplicity and space limitations.
B. Proof of Lemma 1
The matrix A can be represented as Since G k (t) > 0 and Z > 0, each element in the summation is less than 1 and overall value of the summation is less than KT , and this clearly leads to 1 + v TÂ−1 u = 0. By ShermanMorrison Formula [44] , if 1 + v TÂ−1 u = 0, then
